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Abstract
Recent outbreaks of Ebola, H1N1 and other infectious diseases have shown that the as-
sumptions underlying the established theory of epidemics management are too idealistic.
For an improvement of procedures and organizations involved in fighting epidemics, ex-
tended models of epidemics management are required. The necessary extensions consist in
a representation of the management loop and the potential frictions influencing the loop.
The effects of the nondeterministic frictions can be taken into account by including the
measures of robustness and risk in the assessment of management options. Thus, besides
of the increased structural complexity resulting from the model extensions, the computa-
tional complexity of the task of epidemics management — interpreted as an optimization
problem — is increased as well. This is a serious obstacle for analyzing the model and
may require an additional preprocessing enabling a simplification of the analysis process.
The paper closes with an outlook discussing some forthcoming problems.
1 Introduction
1.1 Threats by Epidemics
Sometimes, epidemics management turns out to be unsuccessful. The plague pandemics in
the middle ages, for example, were not handled effectively [17, 49]. We have learned much
in the meantime. Despite of all medical progress, however, the recent outbreak of H1N1
[11, 51, 81, 82] and other infectious diseases made clear that biological contagions are still a
significant threat. The recent Ebola epidemics [50, 70] has shown, that even a known pathogen
can go out of control easily [54]. The recent series of sporadic cases of infectious illnesses [13]
is the reason why epidemics research is still of high actual importance [36]. This threat will
persist in the future, eventually even increasing due to a variety of effects including evolution
of relevant contagions, climate and ecosystem change, land use, and increasing travel activities
[36].
1.2 Frictions as Threat Multipliers
The events mentioned in the introduction have shown the vulnerability of industrial nations
against the threat of known and unknown epidemics. This has led to the development of
various methods for mitigating epidemics effects in order to avoid catastrophic developments.
Processes and organizations have been established with the intention in mind to fight infectious
diseases effectively. Despite of all these efforts, epidemics management have been confronted
with mishaps and unforeseen problems with potentially dramatic consequences. For naming
but a few examples:
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of an idealized epidemics management process as used in
traditional approaches to epidemics management.
• The substandard gear used by a Spanish nurse was held responsible for infecting her
with Ebola [33]
• Laboratories reported more than 230 safety incidents with bioterror viruses and bacteria
in 2015 [79].
• In 2014, Ebola virus material from a BSL-4 lab leaked out of the lab. Several people
were exposed to the material [47].
• The handling of an U.S. Ebola patient violated many regulations [63]. As an example,
it has been forgotten to process bedclothes of this patient as highly infectious material
[16].
• An undertaker in Germany infected himself with Lassa fever after being in contact with
the corpse of a Lassa patient who died earlier [87].
• Inefficient communication [31, 86] leads to delays in distributing decisions and important
informations.
• Especially the deciders themselves, namely the politicians, provided a whole catalogue
of lapses and errors [88].
• Even a known pathogen may show strongly varying properties. For example, Marburg
virus [64] shows variations in lethality from 25% to 90% of the infected people [48, 64].
• Pathogens are undergoing evolution, leading to unknown and new, unexpected proper-
ties, as for example the 1918 influenza epidemic [51].
According to the examples given above, the management of outbreaks of infectious diseases
quite often do not work as expected from the traditional theories of epidemics and epidemics
management. Their idealistic assumptions are not necessarily valid in practice. Thus, it
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seems plausible to include the different kinds of frictions in the considerations. Frictions will
typically influence the dynamics of an epidemics outbreak in a more or less significant way.
Despite of these effects, frictions do not seem to be discussed in the necessary depth up to
now. The present paper intends to make a contribution for closing this gap. Methods for
relaxing simplifying and idealistic assumptions in epidemics modeling are discussed.
The necessary extensions for a corresponding model will give almost inevitably a ’complex’
model, whereby here the notion of complexity has to be understood in the informal sense. Ac-
cordingly, it can be expected that due to the pure size of the model, the number of influencing
factors, and the number of involved disciplines the assurance of a high level of objectivity
becomes a central aspect. This is done from the system theory and model analysis point of
view. Eventual consequences for the medical point of view are not elaborated here.
1.3 Relevant Papers
Several papers are considering the interactions between epidemics and other areas of science
potentially influencing the epidemics like economics [20], human behavior [1, 40, 55], psychol-
ogy [23, 52, 68, 74], sociology and knowledge [24, 34, 67, 80], and others [58]. A slightly more
complex situation is considered in [81]. The paper [14] gives another view on the complexity
applied to epidemics modeling. An article supporting a holistic view is [60]. A really multi-
disciplinary perspective on the topic of epidemics or epidemics management seems to be still
missing, however.
The statement made above holds for frictions as well. A representation of a broad range
of frictions in a multidisciplinary context appears to be a gap in the literature up to now. In
the contrary, the paper [71] shows the necessity of taking such frictions into consideration.
A paper taking frictions into consideration at least at a rudimentary level is [72]. Delays
as special kind of frictions are discussed in [10]. Uncertainties were taken into consideration
based on fuzzy logic in [42], but not by a probability-based representation in a simulation
model as proposed here.
1.4 Structure of the Paper
In section 2, we analyze the consequences of an inclusion of frictions, uncertainties and other
aspects of nonideality for the system under consideration. The analysis is done both from
the structure and dynamics perspective. Based on these results, we derive in the followoing
section 3 stochastic, genericity, and dynamics as basic requirements for a model suitably
representing such a system. As it turns out, an extension of the compartmental modeling
approach can be considered as appropriate modeling paradigm. Using this paradigm, section 4
discusses the computational complexity of the epidemics management task. One can safely
state, that the computational complexity of task for a fully fledged model will usually be not
tractable in practice. Measures of complexity reduction are necessary for making the problem
feasible. The paper closes with a short outlook in section 5 summarizing the results and
showing options for a future development of the topic.
2 The System of Epidemics Management
For discussing the epidemics management problems we will consider epidemics management as
a system. The exploration of this system provides important informations about its properties.
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They are used in the next situation for the decision about an appropriate modeling paradigm.
2.1 Representation of Influencing Areas
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Figure 2: Figure 1 supplemented by important disciplines and components with a potential
influence on the epidemics management process.
The mathematical modeling of epidemics and actions for their management has reached
an advanced state [7, 28, 30]. The overwhelming majority of the scientific literature deals with
idealized situations, however. If we want to provide a model which conveys the complications
of epidemics management resulting from practice, it will be necessary to represent different
kinds of frictions. In many cases this intention will lead to an ambitious project, because it
may require the modeling of both the influences causing frictions as well as the organizational
processes for resolving them. These model extensions have to be integrated with the epidemics
management core model and will lead almost inevitably to a multidisciplinary model describing
the relationships, interactions, and collaboration between many epidemics-relevant disciplines
[37, 59]. Let us take a look at the diversity of potentially epidemics-relevant disciplines as
seen in figure 2.
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• Ecology may become important as soon as hosts and vectors are important for spreading
a disease [22, 73]
• Climate may have a significant influence on the spreading of an epidemics [18, 29].
• Sociological aspects like traditional practices and burial rites [70, 83] are influencing the
infection rate.
• Logistics and infrastructure are important e.g. for distributing vaccination sets and
transporting infected persons (and infectious material) to hospitals and quarantine units
[21].
• Politics, including different handling of different ethnic groups, opportunism, and cor-
ruption [88], is involved at the global level. In effect, politics may also be responsible for
wars; actually, Syrian civil war is taking place causing streams of refugees. The refugees
may be ill, eventually triggering epidemics or help spreading them [2, 61]. Further-
more, governments are responsible for a suitable preparedness and a suitable execution
of epidemics management actions.
• The administration defines regulations, gives advice, and provides resources, which are
usually limited.
• International Relationships in both political and medical respect may influence the ad-
missible or demanded management actions.
• Psychology [25, 59, 70, 84] make humans react in different ways and not necessarily
according to the intended aims of epidemics management [26, 40, 55].
• The economy is typically sensitively influenced by epidemics, since infected people do
not belong to the workforce anymore [83].
– The costs even of common influenza are enormous [44]. For the United States, the
medical resp. overall costs amount to $10.4 resp. $87.1 billion in 2003.
– The recent Ebola epidemics [27, 83] was causing a transition from economic growth
to recession in some African states [45].
Besides of that, the limited resource of money is usually restricting the possible actions
against an epidemics.
• Religion may have a strong influence (e.g. concerning usage of condoms) on sexually
transmitted epidemics [62]. Sometimes, vaccinations are rejected due to religious rea-
sons as well [46]. Another example were the fears of spreading MERS during hajj and
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia 2014 [38]. Insofar, religion is considered as item of its own,
though it belongs in principle to the discipline of sociology.
Taking this diversity of additional influences into account and giving up the idealizations of
classical epidemics management leads to a realization of a multidisciplinary model, which will
in turn typically give a model with significant structural complexity.
Furthermore, we can state here about the influences on the epidemics system. Even world-
wide organizations exist with the responsibility for handling epidemics as for example the
WHO, but they can make only recommendations. They are not in the position to enforce
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Figure 3: A seemingly elementary process like the identification of the disease of an infected
patient may have a considerable complexity in reality. The picture shows the proposed or-
ganization for handling suspected Ebola cases in Germany according to [85]. The numerous
persons involved in the identification process of the disease and the transport of and work with
maybe highly infectious material have the potential to produce many additional infections in
the case of severe mishaps. Furthermore, the information exchange between the various in-
stitutions may be subject to disturbances. The high potential for the occurrence of faults
and mishaps makes it advisable to include such processes in a realistic model of epidemics
management.
any kind of regulations. Low-level deciders like family doctors, on the other hand, may have
a decisive influence on epidemics dynamics especially in the outbreak phase. A single mishap
at the single-person level — say a person with a highly infectious disease not recognized by a
physician — may be amplified by epidemics spreading across the population to a system-wide
problem. Summing up, we are considering a multi-scale system here.
2.2 Representation of Dynamic Processes
A system is not only characterized by its structural properties, but also by its dynamical
characteristics. For an adequate representation of the corresponding processes in a model,
the main components involved in such processes must be included. As an example of such a
process, consider the process describing the identification of an illness (see figure 3) with the
special case of Ebola in mind.
We will consider another example from a slightly different perspective. Sometimes, flow
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parameters determining system dynamics are influenced by a large spectra of factors. In first
approximation, the infection rate β is determined by the infectivity of the disease and the
contact behavior between susceptible and infected persons. This situation in the traditional
epidemics management may look different when considered from a more detailed perspective
(see figure 4).
The two examples given above adumbrate that the dynamics of epidemics management is
complex and can not be described by a simple formula. Indeed, when taking a closer look one
will be able to identify many feedback loops:
• Parts of the population are needed for executing epidemics management actions. Since
people exercising their job become more and more rare during a serious epidemics, it
will be hard to realize the intended countermeasures at some point.
• Obviously, frictions, countermeasures considered as inefficient, or an epidemics seemingly
out of control may easily cause strong emotions like mistrust or fear in the public. This,
in turn, can lead to additional infections due to phenomena like circumventing control
points, rejection of vaccinations, mass flight, or violating quarantine regulations.
• An epidemics insurance [27, 89] intends to mitigate the epidemics effects by providing the
resources necessary for fighting it. Recognizing the reduction of risks by the insurance,
the insurance taker may be tempted to reduce own preventive measures.
Besides of feedback loops, the epidemics management system contains trade-offs as well. In
such a case, some of the various factors influencing epidemics management are compensating
each other. Take for example the question when to start countermeasures. An early start of
countermeasures will fight the outbreak more effectively. Due to possible disadvantages like
medical problems caused by vaccinations, or the restrictions of personal freedom associated
with quarantine regulations, the population may partially reject early countermeasures es-
pecially in the case of initially low infection numbers. In general, the presence of a trade-off
means that typically not even the tendency of system reaction can be predicted. Perturbations
may be amplified as well as damped out.
2.3 Representation of Friction Effects
There is a large spectrum of different kinds of frictions [21, 25, 70] as shown in figure 5. Human
factors, delays unknown in advance, and unexpected events are occurring. Informations about
epidemics are becoming available only time after time. Furthermore, epidemics management
is error-prone in principle due to its distributed character. Various mistakes can occur during
measurement, communication, collaboration and so on between the individual control compo-
nents. Since these frictions may have a decisive disadvantageous influence on the outcome of
epidemics management [59, 70], their inclusion seems to be mandatory as soon as a realistic
view on the management process is intended. The following list gives a taxonomy of important
friction classes together with some explanatory notes.
Stochastic Variations, Noise, and Frictions: In principle, the epidemics management process
can be disturbed by different kinds of noise anywhere and anytime. The noise may be rep-
resented by stochastic variations leading to erroneous observations results, inadvertently set
action parameters, inadequate decisions, unforeseen delays, and additional waiting times.
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Figure 4: The vaccination rate δ is not only determined by the capabilities of executing a
vaccinations, but also by available vaccination sets. They may be at hand in the stocks,
provided by donations and bought using money coming from the government, international
aid, or a bio-insurance. Taking such influences into consideration is important for assessing
the effectiveness of vaccination as epidemics management action.
Observables: Some observable data may be inaccessible or missing. The pathogen causing an
epidemics may neither always be identified without doubt nor may have always known prop-
erties. Especially in their early stages, misidentification of exotic illnesses are quite common.
A prominent example is the similarity between the symptoms of an early stage of an infection
by viral hemorrhagic fevers and of an influenza infection [63].
Multiple Players: All these players have their own interests and aims and trying to realize
their own plans. Thus, each authority may make its own decisions. This may include counter-
acting the actions of epidemics management. HIV can serve as an example. Whereas health
organizations all over the world recommended to use condoms as a protective measure, the
pope voted against it due to religious reasons. For many people in Africa, the pope was
the higher authority resulting in dramatic consequences for the developing HIV epidemics in
Africa [62]. The existence of other players may produce large deviations.
Constraints: Selection and application of control actions are prominently influenced by con-
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straints. These constraints include the limitation of the available resources [32, 70] like medical
equipment or mosquito nets and of the possible execution rates of management actions like
vaccinations. Thus, they indirectly influence various parameters of the epidemics dynamics.
Evaluations: The assessment of the effects of epidemics and epidemics management can be
varied in manifold ways. For example, the set SF36 is a collection of 36 items relevant to
physiology and psychology. Another standardized set of evaluation measures for medicine is
PGWB consisting of 22 psychological relevant items. The evaluation task is further compli-
cated by different personalities and individual perspectives on the analysts, which induces
some kind of subjectivism. Even applying an evaluation measure at different simulation times
may assess different aspects like immediate epidemics effects vs. long-term-effects. For nam-
ing examples, consider the immediate impact on the gnp caused by the workforce drop-out
vs. the cancellation of economic investments [27]. Since the different evaluation measures are
typically incomparable to each other, a multiple-criteria evaluation will result.
Actions: The dynamics of the epidemics can be influenced by epidemics management actions
[6, 39]. Their execution times and parameterizations are determined by the decisions of epi-
demics management.
3 Models of Epidemics Management
3.1 Requirements for the Modeling Paradigm
Now, we are going to derive a modeling mechanism, which can represent the epidemics man-
agement system considering our findings about the underlying system characteristics. This
means that the model must be able to handle the existing structural and dynamical complexity.
At first, we can state immediately that an appropriate model must be stochastic for repre-
senting frictions having a statistic nature as stated in section 2.3. The simplifications contained
in the model are another source of stochastic behavior, which are inevitable for abstracting
from the unbounded complications of the real world. The explicit details of the system omitted
in the model are transformed to implicit stochastic fluctuations
Second, the counteracting influences of the epidemics and of the epidemics management
actions together with other complications as indicated in section 2.2 — feedback loops and
trade-offs — gives the overall system representing epidemics management a complex dynamics.
A maybe continuous inflow of supplementary informations for the system components respon-
sible for epidemics management and sporadically occurring unexpected events will require
an ongoing adaption of the intended control actions to the actual situation. Both factors,
a complex dynamics and ongoing modifications of the course of actions, make an explicit
representation of temporal aspects mandatory. This is done by pursuing a simulation-based
analysis of the model.
Third, the choice of the model representing the epidemics system may quite often be
subject to debate. A change of the available level of informations may require adaptations of
the model. Different stakeholders may want to analyze the system with different aims in mind
requiring somewhat different models. The deviations between the models may concern the
model parameters, the addition of hosts, resources, and vectors, the reproduction of ecological
subsystems, or the epidemics submodel (e.g. SIR-type vs. SEIR-type). In order to assure
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Figure 5: Influences of Frictions on Epidemics Managmenet Process. The many influences
and control loops make it difficult to design purposeful actions of epidemics management for
mitigating epidemics effects.
some kind of comparability of the results provided by different models, these models should
have a common generic structure.
3.2 Compartmental Modeling Paradigm
Summing up the contents of the last section, an adequate modeling paradigm provides stochas-
tic simulation models with generic structure. Compartmental models [8, 9, 30] are suitable
candidates. As illustration, one can look at the equation system describing the basic SIR
epidemics model
dS/dt = −βI ⋅ S/(S + I +R) S(0) ≥ 0
dI/dt = βI ⋅ S/(S + I +R) − γI I(0) ≥ 0
dR/dt = γI R(0) ≥ 0
(1)
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wherein the parameters and variables have the following meaning:
S Susceptibles
I Infectives
R Recovered people with immunity
β Contact rate
1/γ Average infectious period
As seen in equation (1), compartmental models have an explicit time dependence due
to their equivalence to a differential resp. difference equation. Consequently, the dynamic
behavior of the model can be analyzed by a simulation of the model. Stochastic variations can
be included without any problem. Furthermore, compartmental models are generic as well.
They represent the state of the illness in the population by the portion of people being e.g.
susceptible, infected, or recovered. This concept can be generalized to other attributes like
age, sex, job, hygienic standards, membership to risk groups etc. A corresponding example
describing a quite complex situation involving humans, several vectors and several hosts is
given by the plague [17, 49]. This flexibility allows to represent system structures as shown in
the figures 2, 3, and 4.
3.3 Compartmental Models on Networks
The flexibility of the compartmental modeling paradigm allows to distinguish different sub-
populations provided with individual epidemics parameters. This could be realized by using a
network G = (V,E) [75, 78], in which the nodes V = {vi}i∈I of the network correspond to the
different subpopulations, whereas the edges E = {ej}j∈J with ej = (vj1, vj2) ⊆ V × V correspond
to interactions between them [4, 12, 15, 41]. This leads to an epidemics dynamics described
by the equation system
dSi/dt = −βiIiSi/(Si + Ii +Ri) +∑k∈I,k≠i τSik(t)Sk Si(0) ≥ 0
dIi/dt = βiIiSi/(Si + Ii +Ri) − γiIi +∑k∈I,k≠i τ Iik(t)Ik Ii(0) ≥ 0
dRi/dt = γiIi +∑k∈I,k≠i τRik(t)Rk Ri(0) ≥ 0
(2)
In the set of equations given above, an index i indicate that the corresponding object belongs
to the node vi ∈ V . The flow from the node vi to the node vk for susceptible, infected, and
recovered persons are described by the time-dependent flow parameters 1 ≥ τSik(t), τ Iik(t),
τRik(t) ≥ 0. Supplementary constraints on the flow parameters assure that the size of the
overall population remains constant over time. The equation system (2) is more complex
than (1), but can describe specific situations more precisely by e.g. locally modified epidemics
parameters. This may improve the prediction accuracy.
The compartment approach has the capability of representing single persons in principle.
Since the behavior of single persons may influence the outcome of the epidemics significantly,
such a high resolution view seems to be advantageous according to the observed multi-scale
property of the epidemics system. An agent-based model representing all individuals of a
densely populated nation is intractable from the computational complexity point of view,
however.
A decisive advantage of the network approach in this respect is the freedom to represent
a given situation in different resolutions. A whole national state can be modeled as a single
SIR model, as a network of federal states with edges as neighbourhood relations, as a network
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of roads between towns, villages, airports, hospitals etc. and so on. This makes it possible to
adapt the model to the available computing power and the restricted availability of data. It
does not make sense to use a highly detailed model if the many parameters of such a model
can not be given specific values by the available data.
vC
vT
Camp C
Town T
Road W
SC IC RC
βC γC
ST IT RT
βT γT
τSCT (t) τ ICT (t) τRCT (t)
Figure 6: Compartmental model defined on a network representing a situation consisting of
a small camp C and a large town T . Epidemics in C or T is described by a traditional SIR
model. Camp an town are connected by a road W , giving a network G = (V,E) consisting of
the nodes V = {vC , vT } and the edge E = {W} with W = (vC , vT ). People are moving from
the camp C to the town T as described by the flow parameters τSCT (t), τ ICT (t), τRCT (t).
3.4 Compartmental Models with Control Components
Compartmental models are a kind of graphical representation of a system of differential resp.
difference equations. Such a modeling approach can describe epidemics dynamics and epi-
demics effects on the population, but it is not considered as appropriate for epidemics man-
agement. A management process typically involves decisions about a finite number of man-
agement actions contrary to the continuous world of compartment models. Such decisions are
typically made based on logical conditions over observation data. Thus, we have to supplement
the modeling paradigm of compartmental models [7] with a paradigm capable of representing
logical reasoning [19, 57]. Similar constructions were used in [5, 66]. Formally, decision mak-
ers are represented as control components, which are executing observations, make decisions,
and schedule epidemics management actions as depicted in figure 7. More detailed, a control
component works in the following way.
The state q(t) ∈ Q of the epidemics system at time t is narrowed down by a control
compartment using observations o∶Q → O. The domain O of the observations o may for
example concern the levels of compartments. Ideally, they allow a precise determination
of q(t); in reality, usually only a subspace Q′ ⊆ Q of Q is observable. The informations
about q(t) provided by the observations o(q(t)) are used in a decision strategy D∶O → A
for creating a plan A intended to mitigate the epidemics. The plan A consists of epidemics
management actions like vaccinations, information campaigns, calls for social distancing etc.
to be executed at times t′ ≥ t. These actions may be parameterized accordingly for adapting
to specific infection rates, vaccination capabilities, available quarantine facilities etc.
The ’final’ outcome of a plan A with respect to a time horizon H is evaluated using an
assessment function c(q(H)) applied on the state q(H) ∈ Q reached by the system at the
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time horizon H; the horizon H determines the time interval [t,H] covered by the prognosis of
the outcome. Interpreting the assessment function c as cost function, the control component
pursues ’minimal’ values of c(q(H)) characterized by conditions like a vanishing number of
infected persons, very few persons killed by the epidemics, low economical impact and so on.
The evaluation measure c defines the aim of the control component, which selects a plan A
influencing the dynamics of the epidemics (hopefully) in such a way, that the outcome q(H)
after applying A on q is indeed minimizing c(q(H)) over the set of all epidemics management
plans.
3.5 Compartmental Models with Friction Effects
As deduced in section 2.3, frictions affecting epidemics management — i.e. the control loop
— should be included in epidemics models aiming at a more realistic model behavior. In
the following, we discuss how the different types of frictions identified in section 2.3 can be
represented in the model.
Stochastic Variations: Stochastic noise is a very prominent type of frictions affecting both
input and internal system parameters. It can be represented in the model as random variable
influencing the parameter value. The noise characteristics is determined by the stochastic
distributions assigned to the random variable and the function modeling the influence on the
parameter value (say, addition or multiplication). Moreover, stochastics may be also used
for handling uncertain or even completely unknown model parameters. Such uncertainties
subsume a variety of semantically different effects, which may all be described in the framework
of stochastics. Typically, one may distinguish uncertainties of measurements, parameters, and
stochastics.
Multiple Players: As mentioned before, epidemics management is characterized as a distributed
control consisting of persons with own interests and a variety of organizations with not well-
defined responsibilities. Consequently, the actual epidemics situation may be influenced by
actions of multiple players. The usage of specific observables and actions, the dependence
on the ’personality’ of the decider, and phenomena like limited rationality take part in the
decision making process D. As an example of the effects resulting from these complications
consider the example given in figure 6. As depicted, we are discussing a situation consisting
of a camp C and a town T connected by a road W . If a person in the camp gets infected
and an epidemics starts, epidemics management conducted by the government may aim at
an containment of the epidemics in the camp C. Accordingly, the government may establish
a check point at the road connecting C and T for blocking any traffic inbetween. The in-
habitants of the camp, on the other hand, are in more and more danger of getting infected
when the epidemics is developing in C. Being interested in their personal safety, the inhab-
itants are thus motivated to flee from the camp C to the town T for avoiding an infection.
Doing so, they probably transfer the epidemics from C to T compromising the strategy of
epidemics management. In effect, the decisions of parts of the population will thus counteract
the decisions of the government.
Constraints: Limitation of rates and resources, rules coming from higher level components
(e.g. politics), and other restrictions concerning the execution of management actions define
a set C of constraints on the selection of the strategy D. The constraints C may change over
time since e.g. additional resources can be produced and bought.
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Evaluations: Usually, the evaluation measure c is not a scalar, but a vector c = (c1(x), . . . , ck(x))
of single objectives. Since it is not possible in the general to find a state x optimizing all cj(x)
simultaneously, one is typically confronted with a set of solution candidates. It is not obvious
how to decide in such a case. Usually additional factors come into play at this point like
preferences or risk attitude of the decider. These factors enable the decider to filter options
and to compare the remaining choices with each other from her personal perspective allowing
a decision at the end. Due to the interpretation of cj as some kind of cost function, in the
following cj ≥ 0 is assumed.
State q(t) ∈ Q of Situation
Decision D∶O → A
for minimizing
cost function c(q(H))
Simulation predicting q(t)
for action schedule A
Action Schedule A Observations o∶Q → O
Input I Output O
Realized Parameters
Realized Schedule
Erroneous Observations
Inavailable Observations
Stochastic Noise
Unexpected Events
Different Players
Simulation Error
Different Strategies D
Different Constraints C
Different Evaluations (c1(q), . . . , ck(q))
Figure 7: Principle Structure of the epidemics management control loop. Red text designates
frictions of stochastic nature, whereas red background indicates frictions having global effects.
Blue text indicates frictions with deterministic influence.
4 Computational Complexity of Epidemics Management
4.1 Computational Complexity of Simulation-based Analysis
Epidemics management has a natural interest in the question, which management actions are
suitable. This can be understood as an optimal planning problem concerning the actions to
be scheduled for mitigating the epidemics effects in the best possible way. In the following, a
simulation-based approach for solving this problem is given with SAH(x) as system evolution
function for the start state resp. parametrization x from the start time to the time t = H
under inclusion of the scheduled actions A. Later, we will also use the notion Sf,A
H
(x) for the
corresponding system evolution influenced by frictions f .
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As mentioned in section 3.5, we must handle multicriteria evaluation measures c. Using
the abbreviation y ∶= SAH(x), the optimization problem to be considered has the form
x¯ ∶= min
x=(x1,...,xn)∈P
(c1(y), . . . , ck(y)) with P =
n
⨉
i=1
Ii (3)
P designates the n-dimensional parameter space over which the optimization has to be exe-
cuted. The evaluation measures c1, . . . , ck are used as optimization objectives.
Unfortunately, non-smooth aspects make it difficult to predict the overall behavior of the
system and give the optimization problem a combinatorial character. Two significant effects
are contributing to the non-smoothness. First, the discrete decisions involved in the epidemics
management process may induce non-differentiabilities in the evaluation measure components
cj . Even discontinuities can not be excluded. Second, the optimization has to be executed
over maybe less or even unstructured domains like the position of check points on the network
of streets. This combinatorial character of the optimization problem is disadvantageous for
the computational complexity [53], because one can usually not make use of an approximation
process for finding the optimum anymore. An approximation relies on certain smoothness
and continuity properties not necessarily given here. Without further knowledge about the
behavior of the system there is no other way than to discretize the problem. One such approach
consists of defining a grid covering the parameter space, making (3) computational in this way.
The grid replaces the maybe continuous domains Ii by finite point sets I ′i ⊆ Ii providing a
good coverage of Ii. The modified optimization problem has the form
x¯′ ∶= min
x=(x1,...,xn)∈P ′
(c1(y), . . . , ck(y)) with P
′ =
n
⨉
i=1
I ′i (4)
If the grid introduces m representative points for each of the n variables x1, . . . , xn, the
grid will consist of a total of mn points of support. If the grid is fine enough, the optimum
x¯′ found on this grid can be assumed to be a viable approximation of the real optimum x¯
meaning x¯′ ≈ x¯. Since the behavior of the system between the grid points is unknown and any
attempt to reconstruct intermediate values from the data given for the points of support thus
disputable, the validity of the assumed approximation property x¯′ ≈ x¯ can not be guaranteed,
however. The chances of being valid is increased by choosing a finer grid, though the higher
number of simulation runs required for solving (3) on a finer grid is a limiting factor for a grid
refinement.
4.2 Enabling a Simulation-based Analysis by Complexity Reduction
The optimization problem (3) is hard to solve because of the typically large number of system
parameters. Furthermore, possible discontinuities e.g. due to decisions about management
actions and the eventual presence of discrete aspects hamper the usage of approximation
methods. Thus, one may be interested in methods for simplifying the optimization problem
as long as they do not compromise the quality of the solution in an inacceptable way. Such
a method is described in the following based on restricting the given optimization problem to
the essential system parameters.
At first the system parameters xi are ranked with respect to their importance for the op-
timization problem based on a sensitivity analysis. According to [77], a sensitivity assessment
using an isolated analysis of the parameters xi is attractive because of its simplicity. If we
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assume that the domain Ii of the i-th parameter xi is an interval Ii = [ai, bi], this approach
allows an immediate calculation of the sensitivity coefficients si according to
si ∶= SH(bi) − SH(ai)
bi − ai
(5)
as long as the variations of the outcome SH of the system evolution across Ii is limited. When
stronger variations occur, the simple measure of sensitivity given in (5) has to be replaced
by expressions using additional points of support. In the case of many system parameters xi,
the combined handling of all n variables using a design of experiment may be more effective.
Though a full factorial design may still need 2n points of support, a fractional design may scale
down this number to n + 1 points of support corresponding to a computational complexity of
order O(n). This means a reduction of the number of simulation runs from the exponential
to the linear scale, which makes the fractional design comparable to method (5) from the
viewpoint of computational complexity. A more detailed discussion of sensitivity analysis
applied to epidemics research can be found in [76].
Using the calculated sensitivity of the parameters xi, we can now rank the xi according to
their scale of influence on the system behavior. The ranking makes it possible to simplify the
optimization problem (4) by restricting the parameter space P to the subspace of parameters
influencing the outcome sensitively. The other parameters are set to fixed values x0j ∈ I ′j. The
choice of x0j is uncritical because the parameter xj has no sensitive influence on x¯
′ according to
construction. Let us assume w.r.o.g. that the indices 1, . . . , n are already ordered according to
the ranking and that only the first n′ ≤ n parameters are included in the simplified optimization
procedure. Consequently, the variables xn′+1, . . . , xn have to be set to fixed values x
0
n′+1 ∈
I ′n′+1, . . . , x
0
n
∈ I ′
n
. This gives the simplified optimization problem
x¯′′ ∶= min
x=(x
1
,...,x
n′
,x0
n′+1
,...,x0
n
)∈P ′′
(c1(y), . . . , ck(y)) with P
′′ =
n′
⨉
i=1
I ′i (6)
Since the parameters set to fixed values have low sensitivity, their variation would cause only
small disturbances of the result. Thus, it presumably holds x¯′′ ≈ x¯′. Together with x¯′ ≈ x¯, this
leads to x¯′′ ≈ x¯.
The number n′ of parameters xi included in the simplified optimization problem (6) is
a trade-off between the computational tractability of the optimization problem (6) and the
quality of approximation of the full problem (3). Tt is expected that the parameters excluded
from variation in (6) give only small corrections; thus they may refine but should not de-
termine the solution. For validating the approximation property one can check whether the
parameters xn′+1, . . . , xn excluded from the optimization process are indeed producing only
small corrections. This can be done e.g. by executing corresponding Monte-Carlo runs.
4.3 Principle Strategy of Friction Analysis
The strategy described above can solve the basic optimization problem of epidemics manage-
ment. We are continuing the considerations for the inclusion of frictions in the optimization
process (see figure 5). Due to their fundamentally different character, we distinguish deter-
ministic and nondeterministic frictions in the following. Many deterministic frictions can be
included in the optimization problem without any change of the formalism. The constraints
C and effects of limited rationality, for example, are canonically represented by a modification
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of the mapping D describing the decision strategy. Not that clear is an appropriate strategy
for the inclusion of nondeterministic frictions. We provide methods for handling stochastic
disturbances representing noise and game-theoretic disturbances caused by different, not fully
cooperative players.
Concerning stochastic noise, the various influences on the system dynamics are typically in-
dependent from each other and will thus usually lead only to local variations. Game-theoretic
events, in the contrary, may be correlated. The existence of an ’intelligent’ player following a
distinct strategy may produce a ’systematic’ deviation from the intended plan. This may pro-
voke a globally different solution, which is a fundamental difference to stochastics. A common
property of both kinds of nondeterministic frictions is that ’punctual’ considerations are inade-
quate. Instead, considerations based on simulation result families become of interest, whereby
the members of such a family represent the different potential futures. Ongoing adaptations
of the scheduled epidemics management actions for correcting unforeseen or unexpected de-
velopments and for taking additional and new informations into account are contributing to
the variation of the outcomes.
The effects of nondeterministic frictions are quantified by risk and robustness measures as-
sessing the effects of stochastic and game-theoretic variations. In effect, these measures can be
handled analogous to the cost estimates provided by the evaluation measures cj . Consequently,
for including them in the optimization problem, the vector c = (c1, . . . , ck) of evaluation criteria
is extended by the robustness and risk measures.
A remark is necessary concerning the risk measure. Risk is used here for characterizing
global variations. Thus, one may be tempted to argue that risk is a property of the overall
system and not a quantity assigned to individual points of support. In fact, however, the risk
is calculated for a specific scenario associated with the point of support, which is typically
determined by the action schedule for fighting the epidemics. The measured risk does not
assess the possible disadvantages associated with the epidemics, but the possible disadvantages
associated with a specific scenario. Thus, the risk is measured at each point of support.
The extension of the vector c is essential for taking nondeterministic frictions into account.
Besides of that, the sensitivity analysis procedure may have to be adapted as well. Since for
each point of support of the discretized optimization problem (4) the single deterministic
outcome is replaced by a whole set of outcomes caused by stochastic and/or game-theoretic
variations, one may fit a smooth surface middling out the variations. A typical candidate for
such a surface is a quadratic multivariate polynom of the form
y = d +∑
i
dixi +∑
j
∑
k≤j
djkxjxk.
The coefficients of the fitted surface can then be used for deriving the sensitivity coefficients
si for the parameters xi.
4.4 Assessing Local Variations: Robustness Measure
As stated above, nondeterministic frictions are taken into account by considering the set of
possible futures generated by these frictions. At first, we consider the case of stochastic
frictions. Due to their local nature, they can be characterized by the size of deviations from
the deterministic outcome. Here, this quantity is measured by the robustness of the outcome,
since it assesses the stability of the selected action schedule A with respect to the influence of
frictions. A robust schedule A is a plausibility argument for the feasibility of A.
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Robustness has been defined in many different ways [3]. For our purposes, we will define
robustness as the degree to which a system can preserve a given set of system properties
with a given set F of (stochastic) frictions applied to the system. The term ’preservation of
system properties’ means that the cost estimates provided by the evaluation measures cj do
not exceed excessively the outcome for the friction-free situation. The set F is given by the
frictions included in the underlying model as e.g. seen in figure 7. Though F maybe limited
to stochastic frictions, it may also include other frictions as well.
Formally [35], the robustness Bj of the system S against a set F of frictions can be
described as
Bj = ∫
F
D(cj(yf)) ⋅L(cj(yf))f. (7)
with yf ∶= Sf,AH (x) for an action schedule A and under influence of a friction f ∈ F . The
function L(cj(yf)) gives the likelihood density for an evaluation measure value equal to cj(yf).
Using the abbreviations yf ∶= Sf,AH (x), y ∶= SAH(x), the assessment function D(cj(yf)) is
defined as follows
D(cj(yf)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 for cj(yf) ≤ cj(y)
0 for cj(yf) > cj(y) + δ
cj(y)/cj(yf) for cj(y) < cj(yf) ≤ cj(y) + δ
Let us take a closer look at the different cases. If cj(yf) is less or equal than cj(y), then the
friction (unexpectedly) improves the outcome compared to the friction-free situation. This
is considered as perfectly robust, and thus a value of 1 is assigned. On the other hand, if
the inclusion of the friction f is worsening the outcome by more than a predefined offset
δ ≥ 0 compared to the friction-free situation, a value D(cj(yf)) = 0 indicates the presence of
a fundamental problem. For the remaining third case, which describes a situation between
these two extremes, the value of D(cj(yf)) is given by cj(y)/cj(yf). Since the condition
of this case is given by cj(y) < cj(yf) ≤ cj(y) + δ, it holds cj(y)/cj(yf) ∈]0,1]. Due to
0 ≤ cj(y) < cj(yf), the division is well-defined. Summing up, D(cj(yf)) returns a relative
assessment of the robustness of the outcome by comparing the evaluation under frictions with
the corresponding value for the friction-free situation.
The definition of Bj has to be discretized for assuring computability. Accordingly, the
codomain [0,∞[ of the components cj of the evaluation measure is binned by a partition
relation ∼ to a countable range of values. Based on this modification, the robustness given by
the integral (7) is approximated by the sum
B = ∑
Z∈[cj(yf )]∼
D(Z)L(Z) (8)
Robustness is measuring specific effects of stochastics on the final outcome. A canonical
method for calculating the robustness (8) is the execution of NB Monte-Carlo runs. This
means in effect, that for calculating Bj for each of the mn points of support a total of NB ⋅
mn simulation runs are necessary. The choice of NB depends on the required statistical
significance, the underlying model of variations as for example stochastic vs. systematic
variations, and the structure of the model. This topic is not discussed here any further.
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4.5 Frictions causing Global Variations: Risk Measure
Though stochastic variations will usually produce only minor deviations from the expected
behavior, large deviations may very well occur with a small probability. Large deviations may
also be caused by other players belonging to the system and pursuing own interests. The
already known robustness measure Bj provides the fraction of outcomes, which are deviating
significantly from the friction-less outcome due to the inclusion of frictions, but it does not pro-
vide any statement about the system behavior in the case of a large deviation. The epidemics
management specialist may be very well interested in such statements, however, for deciding
whether the system behavior in the presence of frictions is either predominantly good-natured
or fatal. For closing this gap, the determination of a risk measure is recommended here, which
covers the whole space of possible outcomes.
Formally, the risk [65] is defined as expectation value of a loss function over a set of possible
hazards for the system. In our case, the loss function is given by an evaluation measure cj
assessing the costs associated with the corresponding outcome of the simulation run. The
hazards to be taken into account are the frictions f ∈ F . Thus, the risk is calculated based
on the likelihood L(yf), that a friction f occurring in a situation with an intended action
schedule A produces the costs cj(yf). This leads to the expression
Rj = ∫
F
cj(yf)L(cj(yf))f. (9)
As in the case of robustness, we have to assure computability by discretization. This gives
Rj = ∑
Z∈[cj(yf )]∼
ZL(Z) (10)
For computing the risk, two quantities have to be provided — likelihood and costs. Concerning
the likelihood, one has to ask, which outcomes — distinguished by values of the evaluation
measure [cj(yf)]∼ — are produced with which frequency. A simple approach for answering
this question is to execute several Monte-Carlo runs. Monte Carlo simulations do not always
suffice, however. So called LPHC-events (Low-Probability High-Consequence) may be missed
by Monte Carlo runs due to their low probability, but may be a significant contribution to the
overall risk due to their high criticality. For the handling of LPHC events, special methods
have been developed [69]; we will not discuss this topic any further, though, and assume for
reasons of simplicity, that the risk is determined by executing a certain number of simulation
runs. Thus, instead of a single simulation run for calculating the deterministic evaluation
measures cj(q) a number NR of such runs is necessary at each point of support analogous to
the robustness measure Bj . Summing up, this leads to a total number of NR ⋅mn simulation
runs for determining Rj.
5 Outlook: Discussion and Advanced Problems
For providing a realistic model of epidemics management, many complications have to be
taken into account. They can be represented in a hybrid model combining system dynamic
aspects and the decision-making process of epidemics management. The usage of such a model
for the main task of epidemics management — optimizing the epidemics countermeasures —
is impeded by its complexity. Notably the stochastics of frictions and their effects contribute
to the complexity, because their inclusion in the assessment is realized by extending the
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corresponding criteria vector by robustness and risk measures. This extension is acceptable
because complexity reduction methods as presented in section 4.2 can be applied in case of
need. On the other hand, robustness and risk provide important additional informations about
the stochastics.
Robustness can be understood as the ability of an epidemics management policy to tolerate
perturbations caused by unforeseen frictions and to maintain its effectiveness. The more robust
an epidemics policy, the less probable are necessary adaptations of the policy to changed
conditions. Consequently, this property allows the epidemics manager to assess, to what
extent the many uncertainties of reality are tolerated. Typically, solutions of an epidemics
management problem with large robustness are preferred.
The risk measure takes the criticalities of disadvantageous outcomes (e.g. because of
delayed countermeasures due to frictions) weighted by its likelihood into account. Since at
least in some cases preemptive countermeasure may avoid or mitigate such disadvantageous
developments, risk may be an important tool of epidemics management. Typically, epidemics
management policies with a low risk are preferred.
Based on robustness and risk measures, the paper shows that the epidemics manage-
ment problem with inclusion of frictions is tractable in principle. As was indicated in the
introduction, it exists a large number of application domains potentially affecting epidemics
management via frictions. This poses some danger to be confronted with the problems of a
world model [56] as the one discussed by the Club of Rome [43].
Systems like Forrester’s world model can not include all relevant aspects in appropriate
detail. For epidemics management, this means that we will not be able to make valid predic-
tions under all circumstances. Taking the responsibility of humans for decision-making as an
example, the complexity of human nature is a principal obstacle for predictability. Forecasts
can trigger a change in behaviour, humans can learn and try alternatives in similar situations,
some decisions do not follow from facts but are characterized by instability and randomness.
Consequently, the accuracy of predictions is not only determined by the quality of the under-
lying model but by luck as well. An accurate prediction depends on the fortune to guess the
decisions made by politicians and other stakeholders and the events occurring in the system.
Though the higher complexity of the epidemics management model considered in this paper
can not guarantee correct predictions, it increases the chances of a good approximation. It
is a tool for calculating what-if scenarios, for providing an impression of the possible futures,
and for showing up eventually dangerous developments in the system behavior.
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